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THE AMBIGUITY OF EQUITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
M. W. Janis*
INTRODUCTION
International law is sometimes interpreted differently by in-
ternational lawyers representing different national, societal and
doctrinal traditions. Thus, there is often a more difficult prob-
lem of understanding and explaining even apparently simple us-
ages in international law than is sometimes appreciated. For ex-
ample, the notion of equity in international law is subject to
such different interpretations that an analysis of the concept
may serve as a warning of how dangerous it is to assume that
language in international law necessarily has a single or settled
meaning.
The work below is, first, descriptive: to explain some preva-
lent doctrinal perceptions of the role of equity in international
law; second, analytical: to evaluate how well or poorly such doc-
trine works in explaining recent international practice; and,
third, prescriptive: to elaborate a third perception of the role of
equity in international law that may help both to bridge some of
the gaps in theory and to facilitate a clearer and more consistent
understanding of what equity means in practice. Finally, a few
concluding comments consider the larger problem of under-
standing international law from differing perspectives.
EQUITY AND THE WESTERN DOCTRINAL TRADITION
The first doctrinal perception of equity is that of Western
international lawyers in the Anglo-American and civil law tradi-
tion. To a considerable extent, this perception is rooted in Aris-
totle, who defined equity as follows:
[T]he equitable is not just in the legal sense of "just" but as a
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corrective of what is legally just. The reason is that all law is
universal, but there are some things about which it is not pos-
sible to speak correctly in universal terms. Now, in situations
where it is necessary to speak in universal terms but impossible
to do so correctly, the law takes the majority of cases, fully
realizing in what respect it misses the mark. The law itself is
none the less correct. For the mistake lies neither in the law
nor in the lawgiver, but in the nature of the case. For such is
the material of which actions are made. So in a situation in
which the law speaks universally, but the case at issue happens
to fall outside the universal formula, it is correct to rectify the
shortcoming, in other words, the omission and mistake of the
lawgiver due to the generality of his statement. Such a rectifi-
cation corresponds to what the lawgiver himself would have en-
acted if he had known [of this particular case]. That is why the
equitable is both just and also better than the just in one
sense. It is not better than the just in general, but better than
the mistake due to the generality [of the law]. And this is the
very nature of the equitable, a rectification of law where law
falls short by reason of its universality.1
Beginning, at least, with Grotius' seminal treatise on inter-
national law in 1625, Western international lawyers have gener-
ally adopted Aristotle's view that equity is a discretionary cor-
rective (applied in a specific case) of a strict universal law:
In judging of the will by natural reason, Aristotle, who has
treated the subject with great accuracy, makes the mind the
seat of judgment and the will the seat of equity, which he no-
bly defines to be the correction of that, wherein the law, by
reason of its universal nature is defective.
And upon this principle all wills and treaties ought to be
interpreted. For as all cases could neither be foreseen nor ex-
pressed by the lawgiver, it is necessary to leave a power of ex-
cepting the cases, which he himself would have excepted if he
were present.2
The basic discretionary justice theory, of course, has been
much elaborated and refined. Before very recent time, equity re-
ceived most doctrinal attention in the 1930's, a time when West-
ern international lawyers had high hopes for the prospects of in-
1. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHmics, bk. 5, ch. 10, 141-42 (Ostwald trans. 1962)
[hereinafter cited as ARISTOTLE]. '
2. H. GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, bk. 2, ch. 16, § 26, 190 (Campbell
trans. 1901).
[Vol. IX:l
AMBIGUITY OF EQUITY
ternational adjudication and international arbitration as
effective and widespread means of dispute settlement. There
was considerable thinking then about the extent to which inter-
national judges and arbiters had or should have discretion to ap-
ply equitable considerations particular to the specific case and,
thus, to relax or supplement more or less strict rules of interna-
tional law.s
This Western tradition, as elaborated in its peak period in
the 1930s and as refined at greater leisure in the three decades
thereafter,4 makes at least two important distinctions. Both dis-
tinctions are tools in constructing an equity theory that can ex-
plain when an international judge or arbiter would or should
correct the law with equity.
The first distinction of traditional doctrine considers the
difference between "equitable principles" and "ex aequo et
bono."5 In a way, the distinction was forced on the international
lawyers by the terms of article 38 of the Statute of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice (hereinafter referred to as
P.C.I.J.) in 1920 and its successor, the International Court of
Justice (hereinafter referred to as I.C.J.) in 1946.0 Article 38(2)
3. See, e.g., Strupp, Le droit du juge international de statuer selon l'quitN, 33
HAGUE ACADEMY, RECUEM DES Couns 351 (1930); Orfield, Equity as a Concept of Inter-
national Law (pts. 1 & 2), 18 Ky. L.J. 31, 116 (1929-1930); Mouskh6li, L'quitO en droit
international moderne, 40 PEVUE G9 ,NALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 347 (1933);
Aufricht, Equity-Maximen und Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsdtze, 5 INTERNATIONALES
ANWALTSBLATT 118 (1934); Habicht, Le pouvoir du juge international de statuer "Ex
aequo et bono," 49 HAGUE ACADEMY, RECUEfi DES COURS 277 (1934); N. BENTWICH, A. DE
BUSTAMENTE, D. MACLEAN, G. RADBRUCH & H. SmrTH, JusTICE AND EQUrrY IN TiE INTER-
NATIONAL SPHERE (New Commonwealth Institute Monograph, Ser. B, No. 1, 1935); Jenks,
Equity as a Part of the Law Applied by the Permanent Court of International Justice,
53 L.Q. REV. 519 (1937); BERLiA, ESSM SUR LA PORTAE DE LA CLAUSE DE JUGEMENT EN
tQurit EN Daorr DES GENS (1937).
4. See, e.g., Cheng, Justice and Equity in International Law, 8 CUmr LEGAL
PROBS. 185 (1955); Scheuner, Decisions Ex Aequo Et Bono by International Courts and
Arbitral Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL ARBrrRATION LinER AmCORUM FOR MARTIN DoMKx
275 (Sanders ed. 1967); Sohn, Arbitration of International Disputes Ex Aequo Et Bono,
in id. at 330 [hereinafter cited as Sohn].
5. By what is equal and good. All translations are by the author.
6.-Article 38 presently reads:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply.
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establish-
ing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
1983]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
made clear that decisions ex aequo et bono were only to be given
if the parties consented and, since the 1946 revision, implied
that these were not decisions given "in accordance with interna-
tional law" like those in article 38(1). Since parties have never
given the P.C.I.J. or the I.C.J. an ex aequo et bono authoriza-
tion, and since article 38 has taken on an importance as a
description of the "sources" of international law even outside
the confines of the World CourtJ international lawyers have
sought to find some way to include at least some equitable pow-
ers within the normal confines of international law. They have
done so by distinguishing "equitable principles" that could be
viewed as being incorporated into international law A la article
38(1)(c), which refers to "the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations" from the power to decide a case ex
aequo et bono, which was sometimes described as an absolute
grant of discretion to a judge to act as a legislator.8
Perhaps the most famous illustration of this use of equita-
ble principles, as distinguished from the ex aequo et bono power
of article 38(2), was in the individual opinion of Judge Manley
0. Hudson in the 1937 P.C.I.J. case, The Diversion of Water
from the Meuse.' In this dispute, the Netherlands complained
that Belgium was diverting water from the river Meuse in viola-
tion of a treaty entered into between the two countries. Judge
Hudson, after finding that the Dutch were themselves similarly
diverting water, asked:
[I]s this a case in which affirmative relief should be given by
the Court? Or should it be said, in the terms of the alternative
Belgian submission, that the Netherlands has in some measure
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case
ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
The predecessor of the International Court of Justice [hereinafter referred to as I.C.J.],
the Permanent Court of International Justice (1920-1946) [hereinafter referred to as
P.C.I.J.] had a mandate identical to that in the I.C.J.'s Article 38, except that the
P.C.I.J.'s Article 38 did not number the first and second paragraphs and did not include
the clause found in the present 38(1): "whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it."
7. See, e.g., I. BROWNLiE, PRINCEPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-32 (3d ed.
1979) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1
comment c (1965).
8. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 371-73 (Waldock 1963 6th ed.).
9. The Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v; Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B,
No. 70, at 73 (Hudson, J., individual opinion).
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perdu le droit d'invoquer'° the Treaty against Belgium?1
To answer these questions, Hudson turned to "principles of eq-
uity," which "have long been considered to constitute a part of
international law, and as such they have often been applied by
international tribunals."' 2 Recognizing the problem of distin-
guishing his use of equity from ex aequo et bono in article 38(2),
Hudson explained:
The Court has not been expressly authorized by its Statute to
apply equity as distinguished from law .... Article 38 of the
Statute expressly directs the application of "general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations," and in more than one
nation principles of equity have an established place in the le-
gal system. The Court's recognition of equity as a part of inter-
national law is in no way restricted by the special power con-
ferred upon it "to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties
agree thereto ....
It must be concluded, therefore, that under Article 38 of the
Statute, if not independently of that Article, the Court has
some freedom to consider principles of equity as part of the
international law which it must apply.'"
Following the distinction between equitable principles and
ex aequo et bono, Western international lawyers have usually
been happier when corrections of strict law can be justified on
the basis of general principles recognized in domestic systems of
law.14 This not only satisfies the prescriptions of article 38, but
also apparently serves to limit the discretion of an international
judge. In an international system so much based on notions of
sovereignty and consent, it seems wrong to many to permit an
10. Lost the right to revoke.
11. [1937] P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 70 (Hudson, J., individual opinion), at 75.
12. Id. at 76.
13. Id. at 76-77. Dipping into the pot of general principles, Hudson then held:
It would seem to be an important principle of equity that where two parties
have assumed an identical or a reciprocal obligation, one party which is en-
gaged in a continuing non-performance of that obligation should not be per-
mitted to take advantage of a similar non-performance of that obligation by
the other party. The principle finds expression in the so-called maxims of
equity which exercised great influence in the creative period of the develop-
ment of the Anglo-American law. Some of these maxims are, "Equality is eq-
uity;" "He who seeks equity must do equity." It is in line with such maxims
that "a court of equity refuses relief to a plaintiff whose conduct in regard to
the subject-matter of the litigation has been improper."
Id. at 77.
14. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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international judge to substitute his own discretion for rules
more or less consented to by the parties.15
The second distinction of traditional Western doctrine dis-
tinguishes equity intra legem,'8 praeter legem, 7 and contra
legem.'8 As ably explained by Professor Sohn:
Application of equity infra legem, intra legem, or secondum
legem simply means that a judge or an arbiter has a certain
amount of discretion in interpreting the law, in clarifying ob-
scurities and in filling minor gaps in the law. When a judge or
an arbitrator applies equity in this manner, he keeps within
the bounds of international law; there is no special need to au-
thorize him explicitly to apply equity. Equity is applied
praeter legem, in addition to law, whenever a tribunal is spe-
cifically empowered to decide in accordance with international
law and equity. As was pointed out in an early case, this coup-
ling of equity to law gives "greater latitude" to the arbitrator;
it also permits resort to equity if the law is silent on the sub-
ject, obscure or insufficient. An arbitrator's right to give a deci-
sion on the basis of "absolute equity" seems to imply the
power to act contra legem, at least to the extent of disregard-
ing various technicalities of the law (such as the rule requiring
exhaustion of local remedies).1 "
Professor Sohn concludes that there is, at least, a rough equiva-
lence between the power to act contra legem and the power to
decide ex aequo et bono,20 and thus usefully links the two types
of distinctions.
As discussed above, prior to very recent times, the doctrinal
debate was most active in the 1930s when hopes for interna-
tional adjudication were high. An international equity tribunal
was even contemplated "which would act in personam, and ad-
just the rights of the parties - by reference not merely to the
strict law, but to the rule which is fair in all the circumstances of
the particular case."'" With the failure of international peace-
keeping and the outbreak of the Second World War, aspirations
15. See supra note 3.
16. Within the law.
17. Beyond the law.
18. Contrary to the law.
19. Sohn, supra note 4, at 332 (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 332-33.
21. Holdsworth, Preface to W. FRIEDMANN, THE CONTRIBUTION OF ENGLISH EQUITY
TO THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL EQUITY TRIBUNAL, at x (New Commonwealth Institute
Monograph, Ser. B, No. 5, 1935).
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for international adjudication moderated and for three decades
there was relatively less attention paid to the relationship be-
tween equity and international law."2
This relative quiescence was shattered in 1969 by the ruling
of the I.C.J. in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.2" There
the Court dealt with the competing claims of Denmark and the
Netherlands on the one hand and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many on the other to the continental shelf off their shores. Due
to the concave aspect of the German shore, if the boundaries of
the Danish and Dutch portions of the continental shelf were to
be delimited vis-d-vis the German share by use of the equidis-
tance method advocated by Denmark and the Netherlands,24
then the German portion of the shelf would fold in with the Ger-
man coast's concavity and the Danish and Dutch portions would
be that much enlarged.2 5 However, the Court rejected the argu-
ment of Denmark and the Netherlands that the equidistance
method of delimitation was an obligatory norm among the par-
ties and instead ruled that:
[D]elimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance
with equitable principles, and taking into account of all the rel-
evant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as much as pos-
sible to each Party all those parts of the continental shelf that
constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into and
under the sea, without encroachment on the natural prolonga-
tion of the land territory of the other.2 1
The Court was very clear, as the traditional theory is clear,
to distinguish equitable principles from ex aequo et bono and to
explain that it was applying an equitable principle intra legem:
The Court comes next to the rule of equity ..... Whatever
the legal reasoning of a court of justice, its decisions must by
definition be just, and therefore in that sense equitable. Nev-
ertheless, when mention is made of a court dispensing justice
or declaring the law, what is meant is that the decision finds its
objective justification in considerations lying not outside but
22. See supra note 4.
23. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 4.
24. The equidistance method is the "application of the principle of equidistance
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of
each state is measured." Id. at 12.
25. See maps following 1969 I.C.J. 4, 15.
26. 1969 I.C.J. 53.
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within the rules, and in this field it is precisely a rule of law
that calls for the application of equitable principles. There is
consequently no question in this case of any decision ex aequo
et bono, such as would not be possible under the conditions
prescribed by Article 38, paragraph 2, of the Court's Statute.27
In a way, the North Sea Continental Shelf cases were an
excellent "fit" for the existing equity doctrine. Not only had the
I.C.J. attempted to justify its decision by reference to the tradi-
tional doctrinal distinctions, but the decision raised the very
questions of the proper limits to judicial discretion that had
troubled scholars and practitioners during the previous four de-
cades. For many, the question was whether the Court had gone
too far down the discretionary path. Professor Friedmann
complained:
But what can scarcely be doubted is that, by rejecting the cri-
teria laid down in the convention and other documents, the
Court, in effect, was giving a decision ex aequo et bono, under
the guise of interpretation. The Court applied a kind of dis-
tributive justice while denying that it was doing so.28
The North Sea Continental Shelf cases, then, evoked a new
doctrinal debate about equity much in keeping with the old.
Once again, international lawyers distinguished equitable princi-
ples, ex aequo et bono, equity intra legem, praetor legem, and
contra legem and disagreed amongst themselves about how
much discretion judges should have in modifying or supplement-
ing strict rules of law.29
The fires of the doctrinal debate were stoked in 1977 when
the Arbitral Tribunal in the Western Approaches case used eq-
27. Id. at 48.
28. Friedmann, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases - A Critique, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 229, 236 (1970).
29. E.g., V. DEGAN, L'AQuI ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1970); Von Schenck, Die
Vertragliche Abgrenzung des Frestlandsockels unter der Nordsee Zwischen der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Didnemark und den Niederlanden nach dem Urteil des
Internationalen Gerichtshofes vom 20 Februar 1969, 15 JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES
RECHT 370 (1971); Rothpfeffer, Equity in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases - A
Case Study in the Legal Reasoning of the International Court of Justice, 42 NORDISK
TIDSSKRIFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET OG Jus GENTiUM 81 (1972); C. DE VISSCHER, DE
L'AQUITlt DANS LE REGLEMENT ARBITRAL OU JUDICIARE DES LITIGES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC (1972); McWhinney, Equity in International Law in EQUITY IN THE WORLD'S LE-
GAL SYsTEMs: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 581 (R. Newman ed. 1973); Reuter, Quelques r~fle-
xions sur l'6quit6 en droit international (part 1), 15 RvUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL 165 (1980).
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uitable principles in delimiting the continental shelf between
France and the United Kingdom.30 The arbitration agreement
between the two countries that constituted the Tribunal pro-
vided, inter alia, that:
The Court is requested to decide, in accordance with the
rules of international law applicable in the matter as between
the Parties, the following question:
What is the course of the boundary (or boundaries) be-
tween the portions of the continental shelf appertaining to the
United Kingdom and the Channel Islands and to the French
Republic, respectively, westward of 30 minutes west of the
Greenwich Meridian as far as the 1,000 metre isobath?3"
In its judgment, the Arbitral Tribunal followed closely in
the footsteps of the I.C.J. in the North Sea cases, using the
I.C.J. decision as the basis for its analysis of the proper method
for delimitation.3 2 Accordingly, the Arbitral Tribunal rejected
the notion "that delimitation of the continental shelf is . . . a
question of apportionment, that is of awarding 'just and equita-
ble' shares to each State in a common, as yet undelimited, area
of shelf."33 Nonetheless, the Arbitral Tribunal held that "in cus-
tomary law the basic principle of delimitation is that, failing
agreement, the boundary must be determined in accordance
with equitable principles. 3 4 The Arbitral Tribunal, in Western
Approaches, followed the I.C.J. and distinguished between the
application of distributive justice and equitable principles.3 5 The
result was substantially the same. The solution of the Arbitral
Tribunal was in "remedying the disproportionality and inequita-
ble effects produced by particular geographical configurations or
features in situations where otherwise the appurtenance of
roughly comparable attributions of continental shelf to each
State would be indicated by the geographical facts."3 6 The Arbi-
tral Tribunal, in its own words, must be responsible for "balanc-
30. Arbitration between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the French Republic on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, Decisions of the
Court of Arbitration, dated 30 June 1977 and 14 March 1978, reprinted in 18 INT'L LE-
GAL MATERIALs 397 (1979).
31. Id. at 400. "
32. Id. at 422-27.
33. Id. at 422, adopting the finding of the I.C.J. in the North Sea cases.
34. Id. at 423.
35. Id. at 426-27.
36. Id. at 427.
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ing equities. '37 Again, doctrinal comment criticized the Court for
straying too far from strict rules and for being too much an exer-
cise in judicial discretion:
How does one know whether a court's decision is a just one?
What objective foundation does it have? How does one know
that the decision is not the expression of the court's subjective
feelings? Such questions, characteristic of this century, have a
debilitating effect on concepts such as justice and equity. 8
This brief overview of the Western doctrinal legacy concern-
ing the role of equity in international law takes us up to the
middle 1970s, when equitable notions about international eco-
nomic relations began to emerge. It has necessarily merged many
different theories into a general description so as to explain suc-
cinctly the shared theoretical tradition of Western international
lawyers. Before turning to the ways in which lawyers from such
a tradition have approached the equity questions raised in the
recent debate about international economic relations,3 9 it will be
helpful to explain, again briefly, the economic and political back-
ground to claims for a new international economic order and to
examine the theoretical underpinnings to Third World notions
of equity in that order.
EQUITY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
As Western equity doctrine is rooted in the philosophy of
Aristotle,4 ° so Third World equity doctrine derives from the eco-
nomics and politics of decolonization. The newly decolonized
countries of Africa and Asia, as well as their fellow less-devel-
oped states of Latin America, made slower economic progress in
the 1950s and 1960s than had been expected. Because of their
failure to narrow the gaps in income and standards of living in
those decades between themselves and the more developed
countries of the West, the developing countries found them-
selves even further behind by the 1970s. Whatever faith their
leaders had had in the traditional economic order of trade, aid
and development was accordingly weakened.41 At about the
37. Id. at 442.
38. Blecher, Equitable Delimitation of Continental Shelf, 73 Am. J. INT'L L. 60, 87-
88 (1979).
39. See supra text accompanying note 35.
40. See supra text accompanying note 1.
41. J. BHAGWATI, Introduction to THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE
[Vol. IX:I
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same time, the Oil Producing Exporting Countries (OPEC)
demonstrated that some developing countries had more bargain-
ing power than had been previously thought.42 This mix of frus-
trated expectations and a perception of greater power led, in no
small part, to claims, beginning in the middle 1970s, for a new
international economic order where global wealth would be
spread more "equitably" among developing and developed
countries.
This call for a new international economic order took ex-
plicit form in 1974 in three well-known United Nations General
Assembly resolutions. Each contained important references to
equity. The first, the "Declaration on the Establishment of New
International Economic Order" proclaimed a "united determina-
tion to work urgently for" an order
based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common
interest and co-operation among all States, irrespective of their
economic and social systems which shall correct inequalities
and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate
the widening gap between the developed and the developing
countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social
development and peace and justice for present and future
generations.4
The Declaration asserted that the
benefits of technological progress are not shared equitably by
all members of the international community. The developing
countries, which constitute 70 per cent of the world's popula-
tion, account for only 30 percent of the world's income.44
As a "principle" on which to found the new international eco-
nomic order, the Declaration sought
[t]he broadest co-operation of all the States members of the
international community, based on equity, whereby the pre-
vailing disparities in the world may be banished and prosperity
secured for all."'
NORTH-SOUTH DEBAT 5-6 (J. Bhagwati ed. 1977).
42. J. SINGH, A NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: TOWARD A FAIR REDISTRIBU-
TION OF THE WORLD'S RESOURCES 6 (1977).
43. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR Sup'p. (No. 1) 3, U.N. DOC. A/
9556 (May 1, 1974), reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 715, 715-16 (1974).
44. Id. at 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 716.
45. Id. at 717.
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The second resolution, the "Programme of Action on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order" also in-
cluded various equitable aspirations, for example:
[t]o evolve a just and equitable relationship between the prices
of raw materials, primary commodities, manufactured and
semi-manufactured goods exported by developing countries
and the prices of raw materials, primary commodities, food,
manufactured and semi-manufactured goods and capital equit-
ment imported by them.46
and
Developed countries should make appropriate adjustments
in their economies so as to facilitate the expansion and diversi-
fication of imports from developing countries and thereby per-
mit a rational, just and equitable international division of
labour. '7
Furthermore, the Programme called for "an increasing and equi-
table participation of developing countries in the world shipping
tonnage, 4 '8 and "[f]ull and effective participation of developing
countries in all phases of decision-making for the formulation of
an equitable and durable monetary system,"' and the "transfer
of technology and management skills to developing countries on
equitable and favorable terms." 50
Finally, the third of the seminal resolutions, the "Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States," declared its purpose to
be the promotion of a new international economic order based,
inter alia, on "equity."' 51 The Charter, "mindful of the need to
establish and maintain a just and equitable economic and social
order," claimed that "relations among States" should be gov-
erned, inter alia, by the principle of "[m]utual and equitable
benefit," and urged states to "co-operate in facilitating more ra-
tional and equitable international economic relations. '52
Such references to "equity" or to "equitable" principles,
sharing, relationships, systems, terms, orders or benefits need
46. G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. DOC. A/
9556 (May 1, 1974), reprinted in 13 INrr'L LEGAL MATERIALs 720, 722 (1974).
47. Id. at 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 724.
48. Id. at 725.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 728.
51. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 251, 252 (1975).
52. Id. at 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 252, 254, 256.
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not necessarily imply any legal quality; they may simply denote
economic, political or moral aspirations and be devoid of legal
content. Certainly such references, on their face, do not mesh
well with traditional Western notions of equity as a form of cor-
rective justice applied in specific cases by an international judge.
The simple explanation for such references to equity is that they
do not have any meaning in international law and at best, they
were included to signal an intention to strive for the rather un-
certain goal of achieving a better economic and political equilib-
rium between developing and developed countries.
While such an explanation may be attractive, especially in
light of Western doctrine, it is inadequate in at least two ways.
First, it is apparently refuted by some, though not all, of the
actual references to equity made in subsequent international
practice having to do with international economic relations.
Second, it fails to take account of other doctrine, ascribing a le-
gal quality to the equity references. The former point is better
reserved for a subsequent part of the article,53 but the latter is
more properly addressed next.
EQUITY AS DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Aristotle's definition of equity has already been presented."
However, he also presents a definition of distributive justice that
seems to come closer to the meaning of equity as used by some
Third World international lawyers:
55
If the persons are not equal, their [just] shares will not be
equal; but this is the source of quarrels and recriminations,
when equals have and are awarded unequal shares or unequals
equal shares. The truth of this is further illustrated by the
principle "[tlo each according to his deserts." Everyone agrees
that in distributions the just share must be given on the basis
of what one deserves, though not everyone would name the
same criterion of deserving: democrats say it is free birth, oli-
garchs that it is wealth or noble birth, and aristocrats that it is
excellence.56
It is with a belief that global wealth has been unjustly dis-
tributed that Mohammed Bedjaoui, prominent Algerian interna-
53. See infra text accompanying notes 87-97.
54. ARmSTOTLE, supra note 1.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 57-64.
56. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, bk. 5, ch. 3, at 118-19.
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tional lawyer, diplomat, and newly elected judge of the I.C.J.,57
blames Europe and the United States for the poverty suffered
by the Third World,58 and calls for a new international law em-
phasizing a "principle of equity." He argues:
This international law of participation, genuinely all-embracing
and founded on solidarity and co-operation, must give great
prominence to the principle of equity (which corrects inequali-
ties) rather than to the principle of equality. In doing so, it
must keep the objective in view, which consists of reducing
and, if possible, even of eradicating the gap that exists between
a minority of rich nations and a majority of poor nations.
There is no doubt at all that it is a far-reaching legal revolution
to have given international law this task of fostering a policy of
development and to have made this an "international legal
duty" for the rich States and a "subjective international right"
for the developing countries.59
At first glance, this notion of equity is very different from
that understood in traditional Western doctrine. It makes no
mention of the discretion of judges, and does not distinguish eq-
uitable principles in article 38(1)(c) from ex aequo et bono in
article 38(2). It does not suggest flexible correction of strict rules
of law, whether intra, praeter, or contra legem, but rather sug-
gests a norm correcting existing distributions of wealth. This
view of equity might be recognized as a form of distributive
justice.
Such a recognition is made by another Third World interna-
tional lawyer, Inamul Haq. Haq submits that "[t]he case for ob-
ligatory transfer of resources [from developed to developing
countries] rests ultimately on the principle of distributive justice
and economic equity in the global context,"80 and believes that
international law is, at present, an "emerging law of transna-
tional welfare and need based entitlement. '6 1
It can, of course, be argued that views such as those of
Bedjaoui and Haq are simply wide of the mark, and that equity
57. I.C.J. Communique # 82/8, April 29, 1982.
58. M. BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, 119 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as BEDJAOUI]. See also Janis, Book Review, 5 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 355 (1982).
59. BEDJAOUI, supra note 58, at 127.
60. Haq, From Charity to Obligation: A Third World Perspective on Concessional
Resource Transfers, 14 TEx. INT'L L.J. 389, 406 (1979).
61. Id. at 423 (chart).
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in international law has nothing to do with distributive justice.
However, if one reads the materials that have issued from the
various United Nations meetings and conferences dealing with a
new international economic order, one notes that in some cases
the texts themselves appear to display the same preference for
treating equity as a matter of distributive justice.
For example, "The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices," adopted on April 22, 1980 at the United Nations
Conference on Restrictive Business Practices declared "that re-
strictive business practices can adversely affect international
trade, particularly that of developing countries, and the eco-
nomic development of these countries" affirmed that its objec-
tive is to contribute to the "development and improvement of
international economic relations on a just and equitable basis."' 2
What is the sense of "equitable," a notion finding its way into
the document's title as well as its preamble? Under a subsection
entitled "Preferential or differential treatment for developing
countries," it is stated:
In order to ensure the equitable application of the Set of Prin-
ciples and Rules, States, particularly of developed countries,
should take into account in their control of restrictive business
practices the development, financial and trade needs of devel-
oping countries, in particular the least developed countries, for
the purposes especially of developing countries in:
(a) promoting the establishment or development of domestic
industries and the economic development of other sectors of
the economy; and
(b) encouraging their economic development through regional
or global arrangements among developing countries. 3
Two Western participants in the negotiations leading to the
drafting of the Set of Equitable Principles and Rules observed
that the Group of 77's "favorite modifier was 'equitable,' with its
aura of egalitarianism. ' 64 One wonders if this is a proper charac-
terization of the Third World's meaning of "equitable." The
very heading, "Preferential or differential treatment for develop-
ing countries," demonstrates the anti-egalitarian aspect of the
62. U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF./10 (May 2, 1980), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 813, 814 (1980).
63. Id. at 817.
64. Atkeson & Gill, The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code: A Step in
the North-South Dialogue, 15 INT'L LAW. 1, 6 at n.11 (1981).
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Third World's interpretation of "equitable principles." "Equita-
ble" in this document seems to mean what Bedjaoui and Haq
would have it mean: a form of distributive justice, aimed to meet
the needs of the developing countries.
There are, however, many other references to equity or to
things equitable in recent international practice that less clearly
indicate the accuracy of such a distributive justice explanation
of the meaning of equity. Some such references are, in fact, am-
biguous and can be read differently depending on one's percep-
tions of the meaning of the term. Before turning to some exam-
ples, let us return to Western doctrine to see how some Western
international lawyers have dealt with equity in its recent appear-
ances in practice.
EQUITY AS DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
Third World international lawyers nowadays see equity no-
tions as emerging from perceived economic and political injus-
tices in the global distribution of wealth and power. Western in-
ternational lawyers, however, have generally remained true to
their tradition, viewing equity as a flexible corrective function in
specific cases not well-handled by strict universal rules. It is sub-
mitted that this traditional perception of equity is best charac-
terized as discretionary justice. This may be seen in two recent
commentaries by noted Western international lawyers dealing,
inter alia, with the use of equity notions in international
relations.
The first, by Ian Brownlie, considers the international legal
status of natural resources, and in a section entitled "The Rele-
vance of Equitable Principles" considers equity because "at first
sight equity provides a major source of principles of distribu-
tion. '65 After noting that "concepts of equity and consistency
appear as a natural part of legal and therefore of judicial reason-
ing,"6 6 Brownlie describes and criticizes the recent maritime de-
cisions employing equitable principles:
The principles laid down in the North Sea Continental Shelf
cases as applied and elaborated upon by the distinguished
Court of Arbitration in the Western Approaches Arbitration
65. Brownlie, Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law (Some As-
pects), 162 HAGUE ACADEMY, RECUEIL DES Couxs 245, 287 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Brownlie, Legal Status].
66. Id.
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lead to a striking result. There is no longer even a presumption
in favor of equidistance in the case of adjacent areas of shelf,
and the actual delimitation produced in the Western Ap-
proaches Arbitration on the basis of "equitable principles"
suggests that in this context such principles amount to no more
than a bundle of highly impressionistic ideas about the "dis-
torting" effect, so-called, of islands. Employed in this way "eq-
uitable principles" become merely faint indications of the rea-
soning, or of the unreasoned premises, on which judicial
discretion has been exercised and may be exercised in other
cases. The point is a simple one: with little or no clear content
a direction to apply equitable principles is a conferment of a
general discretionary power upon the decision-making body. 7
It is on this basis that Brownlie altogether rejects the utility of
equity for difficult problems facing international law, implicitly
including those of international economic relations:
The material concerning equitable principles in contemporary
international law seems to justify two general observations.
First, the role of equitable principles is limited to particular
contexts and to the occasional necessities of legal and judicial
reasoning. Secondly, the most significant role of "equitable
principles" is to confer a wider discretion on tribunals and this
also in specific contexts. Whatever the particular and intersti-
tial significance of equity in the law of nations, as a general
reservoir of ideas and solutions for sophisticated problems it
offers little but disappointment. "
For present purposes, Brownlie's hostility towards the role
of equity in international law is less important than his interpre-
tation of equity's role largely to be conferring "a wider discretion
on tribunals." '6 9 Although in the work quoted above he does not
refer in great detail to Western equity doctrine, his larger trea-
tise shows a reliance on such doctrine, the greater part of the
equity section there being devoted to aspects of the distinction
between equitable principles and the principle of ex aequo et
bono.7° What is curious, if not altogether surprising, is that
Brownlie should assume that the doctrinal analysis traditionally
employed to describe and critique problems relating to judicial
discretion, should be used in describing and criticizing equitable
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 27-29 (3d ed. 1979).
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claims for a new international economic order. It should be
pointed out that later in the quoted work, Brownlie does ad-
dress "principles of preference as agents of distributive justice
working in favour of developing States,"'1 but does so without
reference to the potential for the application of equity and
largely to show that such preferences run up against a very real
problem if one does not or can not adequately define what is
meant by a "developing state. '72
The second important Western comment is by Elihu Lau-
terpacht. Although Lauterpacht is more favorably disposed to-
wards the use of equity than Brownlie, both Westerners agree
that equity in international law is a form of discretionary justice.
Lauterpacht distinguishes his use of equity from that where the
principle of equity applied has
specific content which does not vary according to the factual
context in which it falls to be applied. With this kind of 'prin-
ciple of equity' or 'equity' we are not here concerned. Instead
we are occupied with something much vaguer and more rela-
tive, more closely comparable with the concept of ex aequo et
bono as it appears in Article 38(2) of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice.7 3
Lauterpacht points out that "the concept of equity is increas-
ingly being employed as an element in the description of specific
international legal relationships. ' 74 As examples, he cites cases
from the 1930s, the recent cases involving maritime delimitation
and some instances from recent treaty or draft treaty practice.7"
He then argued "that the idea of equity is often introduced
without sufficient elaboration of its content, 70 relying not on
the argument made above about the difference between equity
as distributive and as discretionary justice, but primarily on the
argument that the Court in the North Sea and Icelandic Fisher-
ies cases and the arbitral tribunal in Western Approaches inad-
71. Brownlie, Legal Status, supra note 65, at 301.
72. Id. at 301-05.
73. Lauterpacht, Equity, Evasion, Equivocation and Evolution in International
Law, PROCEEDINGS AND COMMITTEE REPORTS OF THE AM. BRANCH OF THE INT'L L. ASS'N
(1977-78) 33, 33-34.
74. Id. at 33.
75. Id. at 34-39. Lauterpacht notes that the word "equity" appears in at least six
different places in the Informal Composite Negotiating Text of the Law of the Sea. Id. at
37. References to equity are also found in articles prepared by the International Law
Commission and in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference of 1975. Id. at 38.39.
76. Id. at 39.
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equately explain the bases for their decisions. "
However, Lauterpacht, unlike Brownlie, says that "although
recourse to equity may be made the subject of criticism, it is not
necessarily a bad thing. '7 8 By this he means that recourse to eq-
uity may be had to "provide the essential link that enables the
parties to have recourse to compulsory judicial settlement. '7 9
Lauterpacht puts aside the old distinction between equity as a
general principle and ex aequo et bono, but remains true to the
tradition of viewing equity in international law as a form of dis-
cretionary justice:
It must be appreciated that whether we are discussing a deci-
sion ex aequo et bono (in traditional terms, a decision com-
pletely outside the law) or whether we are considering equity
in the new sense of 'equity within the law,' we are talking
about a situation in which the court is being asked to apply a
subjective or discretionary element.80
Lauterpacht argues that if judges or arbiters are going to rely on
such subjective or discretionary elements, they should give the
parties an opportunity to argue the points involved before the
court."1
Finally, and most interestingly for our purposes, Lauter-
pacht returns to the appearance of equity and equitable princi-
ples in recent international practice. He fits these references into
his framework of equity as discretionary justice:
If political factors in any given multilateral negotiation exclude
the formulation of precise rules and lead to what is substan-
tially a prevaricating solution expressed in terms of 'equity'
(and this is likely to happen more frequently as further multi-
lateral treaties of a sensitive economic character are con-
cluded), then States must be prepared to accept two things.
First, in those situations in which treaty or customary interna-
tional law requires the parties to seek an agreement on the ba-
sis of 'equity' or 'equitable principles,' States will need to be
genuinely ready to negotiate seriously and in good faith to im-
plement the obligation thus resting upon them. . . . Secondly,
States will need to accept that when negotiations have endured
beyond the reasonably extended patience of one party, then
77. Id. at 39-43.
78. Id. at 43.
79. Id. at 44.
80. Id. at 45.
81. Id. at 45-46.
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that party should be entitled to introduce into the process the
assistance of a third person. This assistance need not necessa-
rily take the form of binding third-party settlement. It could
take the form of a conciliation - a process which is inherently
not binding. It should, however, be an obligatory process of
conciliation which can be initiated by one party alone without
further consent by the other.82
Like Brownlie, who believes that "a direction to apply equi-
table principles is a conferment of a general discretionary power
upon the decision-making body, 81 3 Lauterpacht thus appears to
understand references to equity and equitable principles very
differently than do Bedjaoui and Haq. Where Badjaoui sees eq-
uity as a principle designed to "eradicat[e] the gap that exists
between a minority of rich nations and a majority of poor na-
tions"8 4 and Haq links the "principle of distributive justice and
economic equity in the global context, '8 5 Lauterpacht reads eq-
uity as part of a "move in the direction of a more flexible and
responsive international law."8" The question now before us is
how well or how poorly these contrasting doctrines work in ex-
plaining recent international practice.
EQUITY IN RECENT INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE
The equity references in the three 1974 General Assembly
Resolutions calling for a new international economic order,87 as
well as those in "The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices," have already been examined.8 In those instances, the
equity references, insofar as they have any meaning, denote a
form of distributive justice, which would meet the needs of the
developing countries, rather than a form of discretionary justice,
which permits more flexible resolution of disputes. Most equity
references, however, cannot so clearly be put into the distribu-
tive justice camp.
For example, article 11(7) of the United Nations' 1979
"Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
82. Id. at 46-47.
83. Brownlie, Legal Status, supra note 65, at 287.
84. BEDJAOUI, supra note 58, at 127.
85. Haq, supra note 60.
86. Lauterpacht, supra note 73, at 46.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 43-52.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
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Other Celestial Bodies" reads, in part:
The main purpose of the international regime to be established
shall include:
(d) An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits
derived from those resources, whereby the interests and needs
of the developing countries, as well as the efforts of those coun-
tries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the
exploration of the moon, shall be given special consideration. 9
This provision for "equitable sharing" can be read cogently in
either a distributive or a discretionary justice way. If equity is
understood to mean meeting the needs of the developing coun-
tries, the provision says that although the developing countries
may not have "contributed either directly or indirectly to the
exploration of the moon," their "interests and needs" "shall be
given special consideration" in the "sharing" of the benefits de-
rived from moon resources, i.e., a share in proportion to their
needs rather than a share in proportion to their contribution.
However, if one understands equity to mean a flexible as op-
posed to a strict rule, the provision indicates that the sharing of
benefits will be negotiated at another time, that considerations
to be taken into account may include, inter alia, interests and
needs of developing countries and contributions of exploring
countries, and further, that the parties commit themselves to
good faith negotiation and, if such fails, to third party
settlement.
Although one might examine many other problematic refer-
ences to equity in recent international practice,90 it will be espe-
cially instructive to concentrate here on the equity provisions in
89. U.N. Doc. A/34/664 (Nov. 12, 1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1434, 1438 (1979).
90. See, e.g., Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development and
Co-operation, Mar. 26, 1975, arts. 12, 58(d), 61(j), U.N. Doc. ID/B/155/Add. 1 (Apr. 19,
1975), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 826, 833, 840 (1975); Restructuring of the
Economic and Social Sectors of the United Nations System, Dec. 20, 1977, G.A. Res. 32/
197, U.N. Doc. A/Res/32/197 (Jan. 9, 1978), arts. 35, 36, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 235, 243 (1978); Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, done at Brasilia, art.
XII, Jul. 3, 1978, 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1045, 1049 (1978); Draft International Code
of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, May 6, 1980, U.N. DOC. TD/CODE TOT/25
(June 2, 1980), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 773, 777, 779 (1980); Agreement
Establishing the OPEC Fund for International Development, as revised on May 27, 1980,
§ 5.05, reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 880, 882-83 (1980) and Treaty of Monte-
video Establishing the Latin American Integration Association, Done at Montevideo
Aug. 12, 1980, art. 1, reprinted in 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 672, 673 (1981).
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the 1982 "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea"
(hereinafter referred to as UNCLOS).91 Not only does the Con-
vention represent a particularly important step for the develop-
ing countries in molding a new international economic order, but
the equity provisions in the Convention display a considerable
and confusing degree of variety.
The references to equity in the Convention can, and in some
instances must, be understood differently depending upon the
reader's use of the two existing equity theories. The quest for "a
just and equitable international economic order, '0 2 as stated in
the preamble, seems to echo the equity language of the 1974 new
international economic order resolutions"3 calling for a form of
distributive justice. The references to "equitable principles" in
the delimitation provisions94 are best understood in the context
of negotiated settlements and flexible decision-making associ-
ated with traditional Western notions of equity as a form of dis-
cretionary justice. The mention of "equitable geographical dis-
tribution"9 5 probably refers to a form of proportionality based
on geography and may be meant, interestingly, to limit rather
than broaden the discretion of the Council. The other and more
numerous references to equity96 must remain, if we rely on the
91. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 62/122.
92. The preamble to the Convention refers to equity similarly to other documenta-
tion calling for distributive justice and a new international economic order. It seeks the
realization of a just and equitable international economic order which would take into
account the interests and needs of developing countries, whether coastal or land-locked.
Id. preamble.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 43-52.
94. There are two provisions that seem to be in keeping with the cases using equita-
ble principles in the delimitation of maritime areas. Article 74 concerning "[d]elimitation
of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts," and
article 83 dealing with "[d]elimitation of the continental shelf between States with oppo-
site or adjacent coasts" provide that delimitation "shall be effected by agreement on the
basis of international law, as referred to in article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable soluition." Id. art. 74 (1), art. 83 (1).
95. Article 163, "Organs of the Council," contains an equity reference that appar-
ently means geographical proportionality: "In the election of members of the Commis-
sions, due account shall be taken of the need for equitable geographical distribution and
the representation of special interests." Id. art. 163(4).
96. The most numerous of the equity provisions in the Convention are not clearly
drawn from either the new international economic order debate or from the maritime
delimitation cases nor do they have another, more specifically textual, meaning. Article
59 concerns the "[b]asis for the resolution of conflicts regarding the attribution of rights
and jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone:"
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to
the coastal State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a
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two existing theories, objectively uncertain. Such provisions can,
like the equity provision in the Moon Treaty, be read to mean
either a share for developing countries based on their needs or a
commitment to a flexible result to be subsequently negotiated in
good faith. Given the importance of the Convention and the
many other references to equity in recent international prac-
tice, 7 an attempt should be made to do better than reach such
an uncertain result. With all due respect to (and to a considera-
ble extent drawing upon) the two theories of equity already con-
sidered, a third theory to account for the meaning of equity in
international law, especially with respect to the practice con-
cerning international economic relations, is set forth below.
conflict arises between the interests of the coastal State and any other State or
States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of
all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance
of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international commu-
nity as a whole.
Id. art. 59. Article 69 concerns "[r]ight of land-locked States:"
1. Land-locked States shall have the right to participate, on an equitable
basis, in the exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living
resources of the exclusive economic zones of coasial States of the same subre-
gion or region, taking into account the relevant economic and geographical cir-
cumstances of all the States concerned and in conformity with the provisions
of this article and of articles 61 and 62.
3. When the harvesting capacity of a coastal State approaches a point
which would enable it to harvest the entire allowable catch of the living re-
sources in its exclusive economic zone, the coastal State and other States con-
cerned shall cooperate in the establishment of equitable arrangements on a
bilateral, subregional or regional basis to allow for participation of developing
land-locked States of the same subregion or region in the exploitation of the
living resources of the exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the subre-
gion or region, as may be appropriate in the circumstances and on terms satis-
factory to all parties.
Id. art. 69(1,3). Provisions comparable to those in article 69 exist in article 70 for "[r]ight
of geographically disadvantaged states." Id. art. 140(2).
Article 140 concerning "[b]enefit of Mankind" provides: "The Authority shall pro-
vide for the equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from ac-
tivities in the Area through any appropriate mechanism, on a non-discriminatory basis
. .. " Id. art. 140(2). A comparable provision calling for the "equitable exploitation" of
the seabed "for the benefit of all countries, especially the developing States," exists in
article 155(2) concerning "The Review Conference." Id. art. 155(2). Finally, article 266(3)
concerning "[p]romotion of the development and transfer of marine technology" reads:
"States shall endeavour to foster favourable economic and legal conditions for the trans-
fer of marine technology for the benefit of all parties concerned on an equitable basis."
Id. art. 266(3).
97. See, e.g., citations in note 90, supra.
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EQUITY AS MEASURED JUSTICE
Having looked to the conflicts between perceptions of equity
as distributive justice and as discretionary justice, the remaining
task is to elaborate upon a third perception of the role of equity
in international law, which tends to bridge the gap between the
two existing schools. It is hoped that this new theory will facili-
tate a clearer and more consistent understanding of what equity
means in the practice concerning international economic
relations.
This can best be done by beginning with Western doctrine
and breaking up its analysis of the role of equity in international
law into two more or less discrete aspects. First is the aspect
most often discussed: the degree to which international judges
should be free to disregard or supplement strict rules. Really
this aspect is a "false" equity enquiry; what it concerns is the
role not of equity, but of judges in international law. Given the
decentralized international political system and the great re-
spect shown in theory for state sovereignty," how can a judge
have the power to go beyond the rules of law theoretically al-
ready consented to by the parties either in treaty, custom or mu-
nicipal practice? However far one decides a judge or other deci-
sion-maker can or should go beyond strict rules of law, assuming
that the judge can exercise some discretion, one then faces the
"true" equity question: If the judge may go beyond strict rules,
what other standards shall he use in rendering his decision?
This is an equity problem common to all legal systems and is
not peculiar to international law.99
It is at this point that Western equity theory most nearly
approximates Third World theory. Where the discretionary jus-
tice school is asking what standards outside of strict legal rules
may or should be applied by a judge, the distributive justice
98. See, e.g., C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-
68 (P. Corbett trans. 1968).
99. One can take a narrower view of the role of equity generally. Newman, for ex-
ample, writes:
The word "equity" and its various synonyms are used in two widely different
senses; in the general sense of what is fair and just, which is the objective of all
law, and in the specific sense of an element of law which introduces distinctive
ethical values into the legal norms.
Newman, Introduction, EQUITY IN THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY,
15 (R. Newman ed. 1973). While I agree that equity can introduce ethical values into
law, I would say that it can also introduce other extra-legal standards not properly iden-
tified as "ethical."
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school proposes that there should be a norm calling for the dis-
tribution of wealth based on need. Advocates of equity as discre-
tionary justice may not accept this as a proper standard, but
they nonetheless should be able to recognize need as a possible,
even if unacceptable, equitable criterion.
What to term this almost-meeting point? It might be
thought of as a theory of equity as measured or proportionate
justice. Aristotle, in his discussion of distributive justice, talks
about the importance of proportion:
The just, then, in this sense, is the proportional, and the unjust
is what violates the proportion. Consequently, the unjust ad-
mits of a more and a less, and that is what takes place in actual
fact; a man who acts unjustly has more than his share of good,
and a man who is treated unjustly has less.100
Both the schools of distributive justice and discretionary justice
emphasize such problems of proportion. This is easily noticed in
theories of distributive justice because they are explicitly con-
cerned with a proportionate distribution of wealth among differ-
ent countries. 1' 1 In theories of discretionary justice, proportion is
considered more subtly, because it is only after the question re-
lating to the grant of discretion to the judge is answered that
these theories address themselves to the substance of standards
used by judges in their discretion. Note how Brownlie and Lau-
terpacht criticize the arbiters in Western Approaches for using
equitable principles 'as "no more than a highly impressionistic
idea"'1 2 and giving "no explanation" for "how the various factors
mentioned by the tribunal actually led it to [its] conclusions.' 10 3
One could take these criticisms to mean that Brownlie and Lau-
terpacht are dissatisfied with the opportunity made available to
themselves and to others to understand the standards incorpo-
rated by equity that were used to decide the specific case. Here
Western doctrine has moved on to the second, more purely "eq-
uity," question of the standards to be used by the judge once he
has moved beyond the application of strict rules. It is a process
that calls for the judge to measure the specific case against ex-
tra-legal standards, e.g., ethical, economic and geographical. The
objections of Brownlie and Lauterpacht to Western Approaches
100. ARiSTOTLE, supra note 1, at 120.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
102. Brownlie, Legal Status, supra note 65, at 287.
103. Lauterpacht, supra note 73, at 43.
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seem to be that the arbiters failed to make their equitable stan-
dards explicit and thus provided no good idea of their concept of
equity.
If we view equity as measured justice, where the result is
fairly proportional to some non-legal standards, what is the re-
sult for those difficult equity references in recent international
practice? With regard to the Moon Treaty,"" using the mea-
sured justice theory, an "equitable sharing" in the Treaty means
that the sharing of the benefits must be fairly proportional to
certain extra-legal standards, including the needs of developing
countries and the extent to which countries have contributed to
the exploration of the moon. While it might be appropriate for
the international regime to use other standards as well, it would
be inappropriate for the international regime not to use, at least
in part, these two standards in making its decisions. Impor-
tantly, it is neither presumed that the equity provision aspired
to eradicate the economic gap between rich and poor countries,
nor insisted that the parties have committed themselves, in case
of disagreement, to third party dispute settlement.
The more difficult test is the Convention on the Law of the
Sea.10 5 As explained above,10 6 some of the equity references, for
example, that in the preamble to "a just and equitable interna-
tional economic order" and those in articles 74 and 83 to mari-
time delimitation, are probably best understood using, respec-
tively, the distributive justice and discretionary justice
doctrines. For the rest, however, the measured justice theory
may help. Easiest of all is article 163 concerning "equitable geo-
graphical distribution" where the extra-legal standard to be used
is made explicit, that is, a standard based on geographical
criteria.
But how is one to analyze the problem clauses, such as arti-
cle 59's reference to a "basis of equity," article 69's and 70's "eq-
uitable basis" and "equitable arrangements," article 140's "equi-
table sharing," article 155's "equitable exploration," and article
266's "equitable basis," where no such explicit standard exists?
Unlike the reference in the preamble and those in articles 74
and 83, these illustrations do not have a contextual appearance
clearly calling for one or the other of the distributive or discre-
104. See supra text accompanying note 89.
105. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
106. See supra text following note 97.
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tionary theories. As was argued above, either theory could ex-
plain the references, but this would undoubtedly lead to conflict.
The solution, it is submitted, is to begin by rejecting the
absolutist element of each existing theory, and next, to take a
principle from each to create a new theory. First, from Western
doctrine, it is necessary to understand that there is no fixed rule,
and instead, as is usual with equity, each particular case is to be
settled with reference to its own special characteristics. Second,
from Third World doctrine, realize that in so settling each case,
the needs of the developing countries, as set out in the pream-
ble, are to be taken into account as one, though not necessarily
the only, extra-legal measure to be used in rendering decisions.
This might be a workable compromise, drawing on both doc-
trines and making sense in terms of each.
CONCLUSION
It is more readily apparent that the present meaning of eq-
uity in international law is ambiguous than that the new mea-
sured justice theory, as suggested above, is an adequate compro-
mise between the prevailing theories of Western discretionary
justice and Third World distributive justice. It may be, in fact,
that there are just too many differences concerning the term and
that no single theory can account for the term equity. This re-
sult, while unfortunate, may be indicative of a general problem
of international law.
Given the different backgrounds and understandings of in-
ternational lawyers drawn from many societies, there may be, at
times, more actual disagreement than would be apparent on the
surface. With equity, for example, despite the term's appearance
in so much of international practice, the term may mean not too
little, but rather, too much, taking on different meanings for dif-
ferent observers. Where there is apparent agreement, there may
be implicit ambiguity. However inadequate the new theory elab-
orated above may be, it is an attempt to bridge an actual disa-
greement in a fashion perhaps acceptable to both sides.
On the larger problem of understanding international law
from differing national, societal and doctrinal perspectives, the
answer must be to devote more effort to the study of interna-
tional law as a part of comparative law. It needs to be recognized
that a single, universally understood perception of international
law does not always exist. There may be, in fact, different per-
ceptions, each perhaps valid in its own right, which should be fit
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together, if possible, with the others. Although there are some
very useful beginnings in the comparative study of internationa'
law, 0 7 there is far less attention paid to the subject than is war-
ranted. It is a matter well suited to academic analysis, calling for
the examination and reconciliation of differing doctrines. Hope-
fully, this study of the ambiguity of equity is a step in the right
direction.
107. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (W.E. Butler ed.
1980).
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